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Operation This report is drawn from a classifi ed review of Australia's contribution to US-led coalition operations in Iraq. It follows the progress of the war -focussing on the part played by the ADFand identifi es some of the key lessons learned during three operations:
• Operation Bastille (pre-deployment of forces to the Middle East, acclimatisation and in-theatre training);
• Operation Falconer (combat operations to disarm Iraq); and
• Operation Catalyst (stabilisation and recovery operations).
While the number of Australian personnel involved in operations was small in proportion to the overall coalition force, our highly-trained and well-equipped forces contributed signifi cantly to the success of the mission. And we are continuing to provide much needed support as the nation rebuilds.
The ADF personnel involved in operations in the Middle East performed their roles with dedication, effectiveness and compassion. Their success on the ground was due in no small part to the ongoing efforts and preparation of military planners and the civilians who support them.
It is a credit to the ADF that it was able to make such a contribution while undertaking numerous other deployments, including Operation Citadel (UN Peace Keeping in East Timor), Operation Relex (protecting Australia's northern borders) and Operation Slipper (war against terrorism).
Introduction
Iraq's refusal to comply with United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions to give up its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and prohibited long-range missile programs, its record of supporting terrorism and its use of WMD against Iran drove the international community to action.
The Government's strategic review, released in February 2003, noted the strategic consequences of WMD proliferation and warned that 'The prospect that Saddam Hussein might threaten to use WMD against his enemies in the region or supply WMD to terrorists reinforces the international community's efforts to ensure Iraq is disarmed' . 1 Australia's support for the United States (US)-led coalition was both an acknowledgment of the need to deal effectively with an issue that threatened global security and an expression of our support for the US alliance.
During the brief period of major combat operations, Australia's forces operated over a wide area as part of a Coalition with US and United Kingdom (UK) forces. Our contingent of approximately 2000 personnel from the Navy, Army, and Air Force performed their roles with distinction and made significant contributions to the success of the operation.
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The ADF contribution to Operations Bastille and Falconer was provided in the context of Australia's commitment to enforce long-standing UN sanctions against Iraq, as well as supporting Operation Slipper -the ADF contribution to the International Coalition against Terrorism. 2 The UN Security Council imposed a mandatory requirement on Iraq, as a key ceasefire condition of the 1991 Gulf War set out in UN Resolution 687, that it fully and completely abandon its WMD programs. Between 1991-1998, Iraq played a more or less continuous cat-and-mouse game with UN agencies responsible for ensuring compliance with the Security Council's WMD disarmament requirements, before refusing in late 1998 to allow further access by international inspectors. In the process, Iraq defied numerous Security Council resolutions adopted in response to its intransigence that re-affirmed the obligation to fully and verifiably abandon its WMD activities. ADF personnel, together with Defence and other Australian civilians, made a major contribution to these UN efforts on the ground in Iraq during the 1990s. Australia contributed forces to Operation Slipper, including:
• a Special Forces Task Group;
• two B707 Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft for operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan;
• four F/A-18 Hornets based in Diego Garcia; and
• two AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in the Persian Gulf.
Australian National Commander, Brigadier McNarn, with RAAF personnel
Background to Australia's Commitment
On 18 June 2002, the Minister for Defence said the Government would consider supporting further US-led coalitions. He said that 'the need to act swiftly and firmly before threats become attacks is perhaps the clearest lesson of 11 September, and is one that is clearly driving US policy and strategy' . 3 When Al Qaeda's safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan had been destroyed, international focus shifted to Iraq's refusal to allow verification of its claims that it had dismantled its WMD and long-range missile programs.
Minister for Defence meeting Defence Headquarters Operations Staff
Planning and Preparation for Deployment Development of Military Options. As it had done since 1991, the Government continued to pursue peaceful means to persuade Iraq to abide by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless, in response to clear signs of US resolve to deal with the challenge posed by Iraq, the Government also directed Defence planners in mid-2002 to initiate contingency military planning in case diplomatic efforts failed. This was on the basis that if such action proved necessary it would be fully consistent with Australia's strategic aims to contribute to global security and to counter the proliferation of WMD. The Government's priority, however, was on efforts to achieve a peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis. The Government communicated its commitment to pursuing all practicable peaceful means to US defence planners in preliminary operational planning in July 2002, and when they invited Australian participation with US planners in Tampa, Florida in August 2002. In Australian-US military-to-military discussions, information was shared but there was no military commitment sought from either party. At the time, the US clearly indicated that there was no plan for operations against Iraq on the President's desk. 4 However, perhaps influenced by Australia's successful and professional contribution to Operation Slipper in Afghanistan, US staff consistently indicated they would welcome an Australian contribution including intelligence support, air and sea transport, warships, combat aircraft, air-to-air refueling or special forces. During Operation Slipper, it had become clear that familiarity gained through personnel exchange programs with the US and UK, and regular joint training and exercises had helped ensure that Australia's forces deployed on operations could achieve high standards of operational readiness very quickly.
By August 2002, our joint operations planning staff had developed a good understanding of contingency plans being developed by the US for use if a peaceful solution could not be achieved. They began developing appropriate options for the Government to consider should Australia decide to join US military action against Iraq.
Inter-Departmental Co-ordination.
The Government's response to the growing crisis had implications far beyond Defence. Interdepartmental mechanisms were critical to ensuring a 'whole-of-government' approach to diplomatic efforts to disarm Iraq. 
Lesson Learned
Inter-Personal Networks. Liaison offi cers placed in US headquarters contributed signifi cantly to the success of the planning process. Many had trained or served on exchange postings in the United States. Their effectiveness demonstrated the importance of personal relationships for developing and maintaining the levels of trust and inter-operability necessary for effective coalition operations.
Defence will review personnel exchange postings to ensure they provide the best opportunities to support relationships with our partners and allies. 
Lessons Learned
Whole of Government Response: Inter-departmental information sharing and cooperation is critical to support a coordinated whole-of-government response.
Defence will continue to emphasise inter-departmental coordination when responding to future security challenges.
Rapid Equipment Acquisition: All operations differ in some way and the requirement for additional specialist equipment is often identifi ed in the planning stages of an operation.
Defence is developing a rapid acquisition policy based on successful procedures used in these operations. The policy addresses stewardship, through-life-support, and fi nancial management. Additional forces deployed for Operation Bastille included:
• HMAS Kanimbla with Army Air Defence and landing craft detachments;
• a Navy Clearance Diving Team;
• an F/A-18 Hornet fi ghter detachment; and
• a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft detachment.
These forces fi lled gaps which the Coalition planners identifi ed in the planning stages of the operation.
Command Arrangements. During Operation Bastille, Australia retained control of our forces at all times, while still working effectively within the Coalition (as has also been the case throughout Operations Falconer and Catalyst).
Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), General Cosgrove, retained full command of all Australian Forces. To ensure effective overall strategic direction of our efforts in Iraq, he received briefi ngs and advice on an almost daily basis from Defence's Strategic Command Group (SCG).
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Lessons Learned
Command Procedures: Improvements in communications technology assisted effective highlevel command arrangements throughout the operation.
Defence will continue to pursue appropriate technology to maintain and improve its co-ordination of operations.
Communications: Although communications were successful between Australia and the Middle East, and within the area of operations, they were sometimes hampered by insuffi cient bandwidth.
The ADF will review communication bandwidth to ensure adequate provision for operational growth.
This group comprised:
• Secretary of Defence (Mr Ric Smith);
• Vice-Chief of the Defence Force (ViceAdmiral Russ Shalders);
• Chief of Navy (Vice-Admiral Chris Ritchie);
• Chief of Army (Lieutenant General Peter Leahy);
• Chief of Air Force (Air Marshal Angus Houston);
• Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy (Mr Shane Carmody);
• Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security (Mr Ron Bonighton);
• Although ADF force elements worked toward the overall Coalition combat plan, there were processes in place to ensure that Australian forces were always employed in accordance with Australian Government policies.
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and special forces offi cers were placed in the Coalition Air Operations Centre to ensure that targets assigned to ADF units were appropriate and lawful. Australian Commanders had ADF legal offi cers to advise them on the laws of armed confl ict during the process of allocating targets. Australia received targets on the US-developed strike lists but assessed them according to Australia's own legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to Australian Ministerial approval before they could be engaged. Australian pilots could, and on occasion did, abort missions to avoid the risk of unintended casualties if their target could not be clearly identifi ed from the air. These arrangements, complemented by the training and professionalism of our personnel, worked very smoothly.
Lesson Learned
Operational Health Risk Counter-Measures: All deployed personnel were required to accept a range of health risk counter-measures. This included inoculation against Anthrax, which at that time was considered likely to be used as a biological weapon by Iraq. Procedural factors led to inoculations becoming a contentious issue during deployment.
This issue highlighted competition between individuals' concerns over their personal risks and the collective risk to teams posed by some individuals not having the full range of counter measures.
Defence has revised procedures to ensure personnel are fully informed of any potential health risks inoculations could pose, operational requirements for inoculations and health risk countermeasures.
5th Aviation Regiment Chinook helicopter arriving in the Middle East on US transport
Australian command and support arrangements were complex because deployed forces needed ongoing technical, logistic and personnel support from Australian-based ADF elements. These elements matched their work routines with those in the Middle East time zone, ensuring command and support arrangements were established and refi ned during the two months of pre-deployment. Consequently, Australian forces were fully operationally ready before hostilities began. Commission's head, Dr Hans Blix, delivered progress reports on 27 January, 14 February and 7 March 2003. When delivering the 27 January report, Dr Blix indicated that 'Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance -not even today -of the disarmament that was demanded of it and that it needs to carry out to win the confi dence of the world and to live in peace' . 8 In the last report, he acknowledged signs of Iraqi cooperation but also found that these initiatives, coming 3-4 months after Resolution 1441, 'cannot be said to constitute 'immediate' cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance ... [to] ... solving presently unresolved disarmament issues' . 9 Chinook detachment conducting fi nal training on Operation Bastille prior to the commencement of hostilities
Lesson Learned
Interoperability: The benefi ts of continuing high levels of inter-operability with our friends and allies, especially the US, is a major factor in successful coalition operations.
Defence will continue to develop international relationships and its ability to operate with allies and partners. A specifi c area for development includes information-sharing on Command and Control and Information systems. Development of personal networks will be promoted through exchange and liaison offi cer programs to facilitate intelligence sharing and to allow speedy resolution of coalition operation issues. Operational deployment of Australian offi cers already on exchange with overseas forces presented some legal and administrative challenges which are also being addressed. After Blix's last report on 7 March, the US tried to obtain support in the UN Security Council for a resolution to enforce the previous resolutions calling on Iraq to disarm and to permit UN inspectors to verify the destruction of its WMD. After it became clear that the draft resolution, co-sponsored by the US, UK and Spain, would be vetoed, the US sought support from a broad 'Coalition of the Willing' among nations no longer prepared to wait for Saddam Hussein to comply with demands from the international community that Iraq disarm. Our forces commenced operations with Coalition naval, air and special force components with whom they had trained over the past two months. While Australian forces operated within these separate components throughout the confl ict, they retained their distinctiveness as Australian elements. They were well supported by ADF logistic troops and our Coalition partners in the area of operations, and from Australia. Our deployed forces were also sustained by the activities of the wider Defence organisation and strong support from their families.
As in previous operations, some ADF offi cers found themselves on exchange postings to US and UK units that were committed to the confl ict. By agreement with the Australian Government, these ADF members participated in hostilities as fully integrated members of their host units.
On 20 March there were 30 exchange personnel employed in such positions, including:
• logistic support personnel from each service;
• RAN personnel on US and UK warships and naval aircraft;
• RAAF aircrew in US and UK Squadrons;
• a special forces offi cer on exchange with the UK; and
• Army personnel in US and UK units. The Coalition needed to continue enforcing sanctions and protecting the sea-lanes by searching and clearing the large number of vessels trying to leave the waterway. Shallow water restricts the types of vessels that can operate in the area. Consequently, Australian and British surface combat vessels, supported by smaller vessels from across the Coalition, were used for these tasks rather than larger US warships. The first part of this operation was to provide Coalition commanders with an accurate surveillance picture of the surface activity in the area. Australia operated two RAAF AP-3C Orions in the Central Persian Gulf night and day. They had a range of sensors to detect and identify vessels in Iraqi waters and around the Persian Gulf. Of greatest interest were ships that threatened Coalition and civilian shipping, including mine-laying vessels and small boats that could be rigged with explosives for suicide attacks.
Australian boarding parties operated around the clock in the 48 hours leading up to the beginning of hostilities. They had to clear over 100 Iraqi merchant vessels that raced to exit the Khawr abd Allah when rumours circulated in Iraq that the war had started. Boarding activities continued throughout Operation Falconer, but with the commencement of ground action on the Al Faw peninsula and the oil fields of Rumailah and Az Zubayr, the focus shifted toward supporting land forces and clearing the approaches and ports. 
Lessons Learned
Intelligence and Surveillance: Intelligence and surveillance information is essential to networked combat operations in modern warfare.
Investments and advances in the integration and networking of intelligence, surveillance and operational information must be actively promoted within the Defence Organisation.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were force multipliers through all phases of combat operations.
The Defence Organisation intends to move quickly to develop and integrate UAV capabilities into ADF doctrine, planning and operations. the diffi cult job of opening the port to shipping. Clearing this port allowed rapid reinforcement and logistic supply to land forces in Southern Iraq and delivery of essential humanitarian aid.
The Australian Clearance Diving Team 3's task was hampered by the environmental conditions in the port and its waters. Visibility was almost zero and there were many obstacles on the sea fl oor and around the berths. This meant that using technical detection devices such as sonar was almost impossible. Our clearance divers often had to rely on touch to locate and identify obstacles, sometimes helped by mine-detecting dolphin teams from the US Navy. One particularly diffi cult clearance involved a sunken Iraqi navy patrol boat carrying mines. The boat was a dangerous obstacle to Coalition shipping, and the Team worked with other Coalition clearance divers to make the vessel safe before raising it from the seabed. 
Focal area of Special Forces Operations in Western Iraq
In 
W E S T E R N D E S E R T S Y R I A J O R D A N S A U D I A R A B I A
Special Forces Operations in Western Iraq
'kilometre 160'
Al Asad Airbase
The training period also enabled the Commandos, helicopter assets, medical support and the Incident Response Regiment detachment to rehearse for their Quick Reaction Force role. In this role, they remained on alert to react to an emergency such as a downed or lost aircrew, recovery of wounded personnel, or to provide additional fi re power to assist threatened SAS patrols. The Task Group was fully prepared for its role by mid-March and remained poised for a decision to commit to operations.
The Australian Government on 18 March authorised the ADF to take part in Coalition operations. Subsequently the SAS entered Iraq by air and land.
Entry by vehicle involved breaching an earth mound and trench system to negotiate a way through the network of Iraqi border guard posts. They crossed the border successfully without contact, but 30 kilometres inside Iraq the force met numerous enemy vehicles. This engagement was one of the fi rst ground contacts of the war. Iraqi soldiers engaged the Australians but were overcome by the Australian patrol's fi re power. When they surrendered, they were disarmed and SAS medics treated the wounded Iraqi soldiers before releasing them. This did not compromise the mission and the vehicle patrols arrived at their planned locations by fi rst light.
A similar special forces entry by air was also successful. The SAS fl ew in US helicopters through an extensive enemy air defence system at very low altitude. The US forces demonstrated professionalism and skill, fl ying by night in poor weather, with air-to-air refueling en-route, to deliver Australian SAS patrols over 600 kilometres from their staging bases. The Australian SAS patrols were the closest Coalition ground elements to Baghdad for several days. Their diffi cult task involved observing key roads and military facilities while remaining undetected. With great skill and stealth they remained deep in enemy territory, undetected by the nomadic Bedouin or enemy patrols around them. They later played a signifi cant part in neutralising enemy resistance.
SAS pass the wreckage of Iraqi Aircraft
Lesson Learned
Training: Superior training and skilful use of modern weapons was an essential component in the ADF's successful engagement of Iraqi forces.
Defence will continue to invest in best-practice training, and in equipping soldiers with the weapons and resources required for success.
Meanwhile, mobile patrols began a high rate of offensive patrolling in a planned sequence of operations. They maintained surveillance on main roads the enemy could have used to deploy Scud Missiles or conventional forces. For the fi rst week of the war, the enemy was actively seeking out the Australian force. The SAS met the Iraqi forces head-on with fi re power and tenacity that shocked the enemy.
The effectiveness of the Australian SAS was emphasised through its capture of a welldefended Iraqi radio relay station on the second night. Despite being signifi cantly outnumbered, the SAS exploited ground and air surveillance, cut off exits to the station and conducted a night assault to clear the facility. They then called for close air support to destroy the radio tower.
Destruction of this facility reduced the Iraqis' ability to control their forces and sent a very strong message to the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad about the effectiveness of Coalition forces and their proximity to the capital.
For the rest of the week, SAS patrols came into heavy contact with the enemy almost every day. On the morning of the third day, a larger Iraqi force engaged an SAS patrol in a running fi re fi ght for several hours. Despite their smaller numbers, the SAS used rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers and sniper rifl es in an aggressive response. This heavy fi re power was supported by Coalition close air support to break the spirit of the enemy assault.
Special Forces Task Group members clear the Al Asad Airbase
Lesson Learned
Networking and Connectivity: Networked military operations contributed to Coalition success with shared information, intelligence and situational knowledge identifi ed as crucial success factors.
Defence will continue developing its Network Centric Warfare capacity through training, doctrine, equipment acquisition and capability enhancements.
In another engagement, a patrol was assaulted by about 50 Iraqi troops with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and machine guns mounted in trucks. The SAS held their ground and their fire power forced the enemy out of their vehicles. One trooper used all available weapon systems mounted on his long-range patrol vehicle, engaging the enemy at different ranges. When the Iraqis set up a mortar to bomb the patrol's position, he used a sniper rifle while exposed to enemy fire to shoot and destroy the mortar tube. The SAS counter-attacked and routed the shocked enemy. For his cool professionalism in the face of a superior force and his significant contribution to the patrol's success, the trooper was later awarded the Medal for Gallantry.
The more static patrols identified 'kilometre 160' -an important crossroads and Iraqi facility that was defended by 200 enemy personnel. Using high-powered optics to pinpoint targets, the SAS called in air support. Over a 48-hour period, they destroyed the facility. Several SAS patrols then assaulted and cleared the installation. The remaining enemy had withdrawn under cover of a sandstorm, but the SAS had identified targets that were indistinguishable from the air and confirmed that the defences had been abandoned. By the end of the first week of the war, enemy opposition within the Australian area of operations was effectively neutralised and the Iraqis ceased all coordinated counter-special forces operations.
It was also clear that the enemy's ability to launch ballistic missiles from the west had been neutralised and the strategic aim of containing the conflict had been achieved. This enabled the SAS to become more involved in denying former regime leaders escape routes and preventing foreign supporters of the former regime from moving in to Baghdad. These operations led to the capture of a significant number of Fedayeen and Ba'ath Party members as they tried to flee the country. 
Lesson Learned
Role of Armour: While Australia did not deploy armour, Coalition forces used armour extensively for force protection, shock action and fi re power.
Defence is reviewing the application and role of armour in Army's combined arms team. The major ADF contribution to Coalition operations in southern Iraq was provided by 14 F/A-18 Hornets from 75 Squadron RAAF. Their initial role was to protect high-value Coalition aircraft such as air-to-air refuellers and intelligence collection aircraft. Such aircraft are important 'force multipliers' and their loss would have had a signifi cant impact. Their protection remained a priority throughout the operation, but the evolving air situation rapidly led to other tasks that took full advantage of the versatility of the Hornet.
���
Air operations in Southern Iraq and support for the advance to Baghdad
Group consolidated on the Al Asad airbase as the regime collapsed and major combat operations ceased. On ANZAC day, the Task Group marked the occasion at Al Asad airbase with a fl y-past of two Australian F/A-18s involved in a nearby operation. Some of the Task Group then prepared to move into Baghdad to re-establish the Australian mission while the majority prepared to return to Australia.
RAAF Hornets can carry bombs while performing an air-to-air defence role with missiles. This meant RAAF fi ghters could accept new tasks while airborne and engage time-critical targets such as the regime leadership, missiles or enemy forces.
14 While other Coalition members used both precision guided munitions and unguided bombs, RAAF Hornets only used precision guided weapons -either the 500 pound Guided Bomb Unit 12 (GBU-12) or 2000 pound GBU-10.
The multi-role capabilities of the RAAF's F/A-18 Hornets were demonstrated on 20 March 2003 as a Hornet involved in escorting high-value aircraft was asked to strike a ground target. Air planning staff determined the priority of the task and analysed the potential for collateral damage. After confi rming that the proposed strike was consistent with the Laws of Armed Confl ict and the Rules of Engagement, the deployed Australian Air Component Commander approved the attack. Minutes later, the fi rst bomb dropped by an RAAF aircraft in confl ict since the Vietnam War was released. The whole process took less than 30 minutes. An initial bomb damage assessment was provided to Australian headquarters just 10 minutes after the target had been engaged. RAAF Hornets were retasked in a similar manner on a number of occasions.
As it became clear that the Iraqi air force was unlikely to threaten the Coalition's high-value aircraft, the rate of defensive missions began to slow.
Australian F/A-18 refuelling from a US tanker while on a mission over Iraq
Lessons Learned
Precision Guided Munitions: Precision guided munitions (PGMs) were used extensively in Iraq. The RAAF only used PGMs, as these provided improved accuracy and reduced the chance of collateral damage. PGMs were sourced through the US logistics system. The ADF will continue to focus on the use of PGMs in modern combat operations, including our ability to integrate key munitions with allied logistics systems.
Air-to-Air Refuelling: Air-to-air refuelling was a critical success factor for Coalition air operations in Iraq.
Defence will seek to progress Australia's replacement air-to-air refuelling capability as quickly as possible.
On 23 March 2003, RAAF Hornets conducted their fi rst deliberately planned strike mission. 15 An Australian fi ghter pilot, fl ying his fi rst operational strike mission, led a group of Coalition aircraft to attack a Republican Guard facility near Al Kut.
Included in the attack formation were RAAF, US and UK strike and electronic warfare aircraft. Together, they attacked Republican Guard targets.
75 Squadron conducted four of these planned strikes against a variety of military targets including Iraqi Intelligence Service facilities. As the number of fi xed targets reduced, the focus of the Coalition air campaign shifted to supporting ground forces. RAAF Hornets began conducting regular close air support and air interdiction sorties against tactical Iraqi forces. They supported the US Army V Corps, the US Marines and UK Division operating as part of the 1st (US) Marine Expeditionary Force. In this period, RAAF Hornets attacked numerous Iraqi military force targets including tanks, artillery, ammunition storage facilities, missile launchers and antiaircraft systems.
At times, F/A-18 fi ghter jets supported search and rescue efforts by providing reconnaissance of an area, and being ready to launch weapons in support of friendly ground personnel.
RAAF C-130 Hercules also supported operations in Southern Iraq. Their fi rst mission in Iraq was to airlift ground re-fuelling trucks into the Tallil airfi eld near An Nasariyah on 30 March. This captured airfi eld was being used as a forward operating base for Coalition air power and logistic support. The re-fuelling trucks were essential to make it operational. Australian combat forces were provided with essential support by the range of ADF logistic forces, including:
• a Navy Logistic Support Element, initially established to support Multinational Interception Force operations;
• elements of the Army Logistic Support Force; and
• the RAAF Combat Support Group.
Together they provided equipment supply and maintenance, security, engineering, health support, aero-medical evacuation, administration and airfi eld emergency response and recovery for all deployed Australian forces. This broad range of tasks was performed by a relatively small number of personnel working tirelessly to ensure that our forces had the means to make a signifi cant contribution to the Coalition.
The need for logistic support did not end with hostilities. The ADF continues to support its forces remaining in the Middle East Area of Operations which are assisting with reconstruction and rehabilitation operations.
Lesson Learned
Logistic Information Management: The success of the logistics system was achieved through careful oversight and intensive management.
Defence will continue to integrate logistics management information to ensure that logistic support for future deployments is well coordinated and managed more effi ciently. The security detachment provided local protection for the Representative Offi ce. They also rendered unexploded munitions safe, removing danger to local Iraqis, and quickly developed a good relationship with the local population. This resulted in several large weapon and munitions caches being handed over.
Force Protection: Force protection remains a most important factor in modern combat operations and requires effective operational planning and use of all available measures to reduce the risk of casualties. The ADF used various measures to improve force protection, including armoured vehicles, body armour, preventative health counter-measures, close air defence on RAN ships, electronic warfare self-protection equipment on RAAF aircraft, and electronic systems indicating the location of friendly forces. Coalition partners' experience reinforced the importance of effective force protection, especially in urban fi ghting.
Defence will continue to incorporate appropriate force protection measures in operational planning and capability procurement decisions. This will include the appropriate balance of physical and electronic force protection measures, including the use of armour, weapons systems, defensive sensors and a fully integrated battlespace management system to help forces survive and achieve their mission.
Baghdad Security Detachment
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Lesson Learned
Force Extraction Procedures: Rigorous equipment cleaning processes are required to meet justifi ably high standards set by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS). These high standards do impose a fi nancial, materiel and manpower burden when forces return from an Area of Operations.
In conjunction with AQIS, Defence will investigate less intrusive and less damaging cleaning/ fumigation processes to streamline the quarantine clearance process in future operations.
The Prime Minister visiting ADF personnel in the Middle East at the conclusion of major combat operations Throughout the conduct of the combat phase of operations, the Government emphasised that Australia's military commitment after hostilities in Iraq would be limited.
As a result of this decision, Australian planners knew that when hostilities ended they needed to contribute to the rehabilitation of Iraq without committing major force elements. Defence Minister, Robert Hill, Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove, and Secretary of the
Transition to Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Operations
Operation Catalyst began on 16 July 2003 and the role of the ADF's deployed forces changed again to one of contributing to a whole-ofgovernment effort to assist with the rehabilitation of Iraq. The goals included assisting national recovery and facilitating the transition to self-government. Defence will continue to deploy Public Affairs offi cers and encourage coverage by civilian journalists for operations where operational circumstances permit.
The ADF units involved in Operation Catalyst include:
• a Joint Task Force headquarters for national command of ADF elements in the Middle East for Operation Catalyst and Operation Slipper;
• a frigate, a Logistic Support Element and staff to support the Multinational Interception Force Commander (about 270 personnel);
• an RAAF C-130 Hercules detachment of two transport aircraft and about 140 personnel;
• a combat support element of about 60 personnel providing air traffi c control services at Baghdad International Airport;
• the security detachment at the Representative Offi ce in Baghdad (about 80 personnel, four armoured vehicles and an explosive ordnance detachment);
• about 16 analysts and technical experts supporting the Iraq Survey Group -to investigate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and associated programs;
• about 90 personnel in various Coalition headquarters units, combined logistics and communications elements;
• a team of six to provide training and assist the development of the Iraqi Defence Force;
• a team of 5 ADF and Defence civilian representatives in the Coalition Provisional Authority; and
• an RAAF AP-3C Orion detachment with two maritime patrol aircraft and about 160 personnel to support rehabilitation in Iraq and the Coalition operation against terrorism.
Security Detachment members meeting the locals in the area around the Australian Mission
With the re-deployment of forces to Australia, the work of evaluating the performance of Defence, reconstituting forces, and returning our forces to operational readiness began. The high level of ADF commitments -some 3,800 ADF personnel deployed on 10 operations around the world in July 2003 -meant that returning forces had to be restored to operational readiness as soon as practicable.
In a tribute to its professionalism, the ADF managed to reconstitute its returned forces quickly while responding to new challenges and additional operational commitments. One such additional commitment began on 24 July 2003, when an ADF contingent of about 1500 personnel, ships and aircraft, together with Australian Federal Police and Australian Protective Service personnel, provided regional assistance in a mission to the Solomon Islands in Operation Helpem Fren.
In preparation for future eventualities, a wholeof-Defence review was undertaken so lessons could be learned from our involvement and from the experiences of our Coalition partners. The evaluation noted the operation's success but also identifi ed many lessons, some of which are discussed in this report.
Lesson Learned
Information Security: Information regarding ADF operational planning and activity remained very secure through these operations -to the point where there was some criticism that too little information was provided to the public.
Defence will continue to emphasise operational information security but will seek to balance the need to protect our forces with the need to keep the public informed of the employment and performance of the ADF.
RAAF personnel being welcomed home in Katherine
ADF Reconstitution, Evaluation and Return to Readiness
Australia's contribution to the success of major combat operations highlighted areas of performance -such as the employment of modern precision weapons systems -that were very effective and should be sustained for future operations. The evaluation also noted areas that were effective, but which needed improvement. These areas include:
• aspects of planning for operations;
• managing rapid equipment acquisitions;
• policy development; and
• communication support and information management.
RAN personnel arriving home in Sydney
There were also areas that needed to be addressed to improve our performance on future operations. These included force protection and ways to sustain our forces once deployed.
The lessons learned by Defence from the ADF's operations in Iraq continue to influence Government decisions on Defence capability acquisition, support and development. Application of these lessons will ensure that our forces continue to be well trained, equipped and led to defend Australia and its national interests.
Implementing the Lessons Learned
